Legacy and outlook

What the history left

The prosecution of economic crime in Zurich today rests on several layers that were deposited at different times. The oldest layer is the Criminal Code of 1937, which entered into force in 1942 and still provides the basic offences of fraud, misappropriation, criminal mismanagement and forgery. The second layer consists of the offences introduced in response to the scandals and international pressures of the late twentieth century: money laundering in 1990 in the circumstances that Part F describes, the revised bribery provisions of 2000 after Switzerland joined the OECD Convention and corporate criminal liability in 2003. The third layer is procedural. The Criminal Procedure Code of 2007 and its revision of 2024 unified the rules and strengthened the position of the prosecutor, while the case law of the Federal Supreme Court on sealing and privilege has set limits to that position.

Each layer carries the imprint of its origins. The property offences reflect a conception of economic crime as an attack by one individual on the property of another. The offences of the second layer reflect the recognition that a financial centre can itself become an instrument of crime committed elsewhere, and that banks, commodity traders and their employees must be held responsible for the flows of money that pass through their hands. The procedural layer reflects the demand for efficiency in a system that must process tens of thousands of cases each year with limited resources. The tensions between these layers explain much of the current debate: between the individual guilt that criminal law requires and the organisational fault on which corporate liability rests, between the efficiency of summary penalty orders and the transparency of public trials, and between the confidentiality that clients expect and the transparency that international cooperation demands.

Challenges ahead

Several challenges will shape the coming years. The first is the duration of proceedings. The Vincenz case, the Credit Suisse Bulgaria case and the Karimova case each took many years from the first suspicion to a judgment, and in two of them the judgment was still not final in September 2026. The limitation period ended the case against the principal accused in the Karimova proceedings. The Zurich prosecution service’s example of data that remained sealed for more than four and a half years shows how procedural safeguards can paralyse an investigation. Whether the tighter sealing deadlines of the 2024 revision will shorten such delays remains to be seen, since the Federal Supreme Court’s case law insists on strict compliance with the deadlines by holders of documents while leaving the duration of the court’s own examination open.

The second challenge is the level of corporate sanctions. A maximum fine of CHF 5 million, unchanged since 2003, is modest for a company whose annual turnover may be measured in tens of billions of francs. The compensatory claim fills part of the gap, but only where the profits of the offence can be established. The OECD and civil society organisations have repeatedly called for higher fines. The third challenge is the absence of a DPA mechanism and of statutory whistleblower protection, both of which the OAG and international bodies have urged. The fourth is technical. Economic crime increasingly involves crypto-assets, artificial intelligence and data held in the cloud, and prosecutors need the expertise and resources to deal with it. The Federal Council’s decision of May 2026 to revise the Administrative Criminal Law Act only in a cost-conscious manner indicates that additional resources will not easily be found.

The practitioner’s perspective

For the international client, the practical lessons of Swiss economic criminal procedure can be summarised in a few points. The preliminary investigation is decisive. The first hours after a search, when sealing must be requested within three days, may determine what evidence the prosecution can use. Privilege is narrower than in common-law jurisdictions: it does not cover in-house counsel, it covers only activity typical of the legal profession and it does not protect compliance work delegated to lawyers. Internal investigations must be structured with this in mind. Companies with activities in Zurich need an anti-corruption and anti-money laundering compliance programme that can withstand the scrutiny of Article 102 paragraph 2, with particular attention to intermediaries, red flags and escalation. Where misconduct is discovered, the choice between self-reporting, cooperation and defence must be made early and coordinated with foreign proceedings. Finally, the consensual instruments of Swiss law, the summary penalty order and the abbreviated procedure, offer considerable room for negotiated outcomes, although without the formal structure of a DPA.

A comparison with Geneva, the subject of the companion volume, is instructive. The two cities share the same federal law and the same Criminal Procedure Code, with the OAG and the Federal Criminal Court holding jurisdiction over the international cases of both. The differences lie in the cases themselves. Geneva, as the centre of the commodity trade and of private banking for clients from the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, has produced many of the major foreign bribery cases, from Gunvor to Trafigura and Lombard Odier. Zurich, with its big banks, insurers, asset managers and industrial groups, has produced cases of corporate governance, such as Swissair and Vincenz, as well as a large volume of investment fraud and money laundering cases handled by the Staatsanwaltschaft III. Both centres face the same challenge of demonstrating that a financial centre which attracts international capital can also prosecute the misconduct that such capital sometimes brings with it.

For general information only. This article does not constitute legal or tax advice, does not replace advice on an individual case and creates no lawyer-client relationship. It reflects the legal position as of September 2025.