Four scenarios for 2035

Construction

The seven drivers contain predetermined elements and critical uncertainties. Among the predetermined elements are the ageing of the population and the transfer of wealth, the existence of a modern legal framework for crypto-assets and Digital Assets, the continued membership of Switzerland in the international regimes of tax transparency and sanctions, and the strength of the research base. The critical uncertainties can be reduced to two axes, because most of the other open questions depend on them.

The first axis is external access. At one end, Switzerland approves the package with the European Union and gradually opens a path towards an arrangement for financial services, while maintaining good relations with the United States and Asia. At the other end, the package fails at the ballot box or in Parliament, access to the European market narrows under CRD VI and similar rules, and Switzerland depends on bilateral arrangements with individual states. The second axis is the institutional anchor at home. At one end, the capital reform produces a stable settlement under which UBS remains a global bank headquartered in Zurich, FINMA gains the powers it needs and the political system finds answers to the financing of pensions. At the other end, the settlement fails: UBS moves its holding company abroad or dismantles its global business, the reforms stall and the political system spends its energy on defensive votes.

The combination of the two axes gives four scenarios. “European anchor” combines open access with a strong anchor. “Global niche of excellence” pairs restricted European access with an equally strong anchor. “Fortress Switzerland” describes restricted access together with a weakened global anchor, while “Managed decline” describes open access that cannot compensate for the loss of the anchor. None of them is a forecast. Each is a coherent story that serves to test decisions.

Scenario A: European anchor

In this scenario the voters approve the package with the European Union in 2027 or 2028, the earliest dates that the parliamentary timetable allows,¹ after a campaign in which the business associations, the cantons and most parties support it. The double majority of people and cantons, if required, is reached narrowly. The approval changes the tone of the relationship. The European Commission agrees to deepen the financial regulatory dialogue. By the early 2030s the two sides have concluded a mutual recognition arrangement for selected financial services, inspired by the Berne agreement with the United Kingdom, which entered into force on 1 January 2026.² Swiss wealth managers obtain limited rights to serve professional and wealthy private clients in the EU from Zurich, which would meet the central demand that the Swiss Bankers Association formulated in its consultation response of 2025.³ The equivalence of the Swiss stock exchange ceases to be a subject of political bargaining.

At home, Parliament adopts the capital reform in a form close to the Council of States’ decision of September 2026. UBS protests, adjusts its capital distribution, trims its investment bank and remains in Zurich. By 2035 it is a leading global wealth manager whose strategic focus lies in Switzerland, the United States and Asia. FINMA obtains the power to impose fines and a senior managers regime. The domestic banks, strengthened by the lessons of the Credit Suisse crisis, compete more intensely for Swiss corporate clients. The tokenised infrastructure of SIX and BX Digital becomes part of a European network in which Swiss issuers and investors can connect to platforms in the EU. A franc stablecoin serves as a settlement instrument for tokenised Swiss securities.

In this world, Zurich’s role resembles that of a leading regional centre with global reach within a larger European market. Its strengths lie in wealth management, insurance and reinsurance, asset management for pension capital and a specialised capital market. The talent base benefits from continued free movement and from the international appeal of ETH Zurich. The main risk of the scenario is complacency. Integration into European structures brings regulatory convergence. Over time the distinctive features of Swiss law, from the flexibility of FINMA’s principle-based supervision to the confidentiality of client relationships within the limits of the automatic exchange of information, erode.

The indicators of this scenario are clear. They include the approval of the package by Parliament in 2027 and by the voters within the following year, a formal commitment by the European Commission to negotiations on financial services, the adoption of the capital reform without a relocation announcement by UBS and a stable or rising share of European clients in the assets managed in Zurich. Early warning signs would be a campaign in which the financial sector is portrayed as the beneficiary of the package, a refusal of the Commission to discuss financial services after ratification, or a vote in which the cantonal majority fails even though the popular majority approves.

Scenario B: Global niche of excellence

In the second scenario the package with the European Union fails or remains blocked. The immediate economic damage is limited, since the existing bilateral agreements continue to apply, but they erode over time without updating. Access to European clients becomes more difficult under CRD VI and the reverse solicitation rules, particularly once the grandfathering of contracts concluded before July 2026 runs out.⁴ The Swiss financial centre responds as it responded after the end of banking secrecy for foreign clients: it reorients itself towards the markets that remain open and towards the quality of its services.

The domestic anchor holds. UBS accepts the capital rules after a final adjustment by the National Council and remains in Zurich, although it separates or sells parts of its investment bank. It concentrates on global wealth management, where its Swiss home and the Swiss franc form part of the brand. The private banks and independent wealth managers of Zurich focus on clients from the Middle East, Latin America, Asia and the United Kingdom, supported by the Berne agreement, in force since 1 January 2026.⁵ The BCG projection that Swiss cross-border assets could grow by about six per cent a year until 2030 proves roughly accurate.⁶ Zurich remains second to Hong Kong and defends its position as the leading booking centre for clients outside Asia.

In this world, Zurich’s competitive advantage rests on three pillars. The first is legal certainty and neutrality, confirmed by the clear rejection of the neutrality initiative, which allows Switzerland to apply international sanctions without constitutional conflict. The second is specialisation. The reinsurance cluster, the insurance-linked securities managers, the family office sector and the tokenisation platforms described in Parts E, H and J become the core of the centre’s international business. The third is the rule of law as a product: the Zurich Commercial Court with its proceedings in English, the arbitration practice under Chapter 12 of the Private International Law Act and the enforcement possibilities discussed in Part I make Zurich a place of dispute resolution for international wealth. In this scenario the Zurich International Commercial Court described in Chapter I.I becomes an important institution.

The risk of this scenario lies in its dependence on a few markets and on the goodwill of the great powers. A conflict with the United States over sanctions or tax enforcement, or a geopolitical shock that makes Asian or Middle Eastern clients subject to Western sanctions, would affect a centre that has lost its European base. The indicators include the rejection or postponement of the package, a rising share of non-European clients in Swiss cross-border assets, the growth of licensed family offices and trust companies, and the volume of tokenised issues on Swiss platforms. Early warning signs would be the departure of European clients to Luxembourg or Liechtenstein, a shift of UBS’s management functions to New York, and a decline in the number of foreign banks with Zurich subsidiaries.

Scenario C: Fortress Switzerland

The third scenario combines restricted external access with a weakening of the global anchor. The package with the European Union fails. After the National Council hardens the capital rules, UBS dismantles its global structure. It sells its American wealth management business, reduces its investment bank to a fraction of its former size and becomes a large Swiss bank with an international private banking arm. The formal headquarters remains in Zurich, but the global bank that the city had known since the merger of 1998 no longer exists.

The political climate turns defensive. The rejection of the neutrality initiative in 2026 does not end the debate. New popular initiatives on immigration, sanctions and the independence of Swiss law follow. The financial centre adapts to a narrower role. The domestic banks, above all the Zürcher Kantonalbank, Raiffeisen and the larger regional banks, dominate lending and payments. The Swiss franc remains a haven currency, which exposes the Swiss National Bank to renewed pressure from inflows. Wealth management continues but focuses on clients who value distance from the major blocs, a clientele that brings higher compliance risks. The tokenised infrastructure develops as a domestic system, with a franc stablecoin used mainly within Switzerland.

In this world, Zurich remains prosperous but loses international weight. Its reinsurance and insurance cluster survives because it rests on global diversification and on the Swiss Solvency Test, which Europe recognises as equivalent, as Chapter E.IV has shown. The universities and technology firms remain attractive, although restrictions on immigration make recruitment harder. The financial centre becomes more Swiss in its ownership, its clients and its culture. Some would see this as a return to the virtues of the guild city. Others would see a loss of the openness that made Zurich a financial centre in the first place.

The indicators of this scenario are the failure of the EU package combined with the adoption of new restrictive initiatives, a shrinking share of international business in the balance sheets of the Zurich banks, a decline in the number of foreign banks and a rising share of the domestic banks in total assets. Early warning signs would be a National Council decision that goes beyond the Federal Council’s proposal on capital, an announcement by UBS of a sale of core foreign businesses, a new popular initiative that would restrict the implementation of international sanctions, and a fall in the number of international students and researchers at the universities.

Scenario D: Managed decline

The fourth scenario is the most uncomfortable. It combines the approval of the package with the European Union with the loss of the global anchor. After years of dispute over capital, in which the bank had put the cumulative additional requirement since 2023 at about USD 33 billion,⁷ UBS merges with a foreign partner and moves its holding company abroad, most probably to the United States or the United Kingdom. The Swiss bank remains as a subsidiary under FINMA supervision, with its own capital and liquidity, but group decisions are taken elsewhere. The senior management, the research departments and the capital markets functions move to New York or London. Zurich becomes the seat of an important subsidiary in the way that it already is for many foreign groups.

The European package, approved in 2028, cushions the loss. Swiss institutions obtain limited access to European markets, while some European banks strengthen their presence in Zurich as a base for Swiss and international clients. The decline is therefore managed. Employment in banking falls, but insurance, asset management and the domestic banks remain strong. The city of Zurich, with its universities and technology firms, diversifies its economy away from finance. The share of the financial centre in the region’s value added, one franc in six in 2023 according to BAK Economics, declines towards the level of other European cities.⁸

In this world, Zurich remains an important European financial location, but its global significance fades. The reputation of the Swiss financial centre suffers from the departure of the bank that had carried the Swiss brand abroad. Tax revenues from the financial sector fall, which affects the canton and the city. On the other hand, the concentration risk that has dominated Swiss financial politics since 2008 disappears. The Swiss public no longer guarantees implicitly a bank whose balance sheet exceeds the national economy. The domestic banks, the Zürcher Kantonalbank in particular, gain market share.

The indicators of this scenario include a formal announcement by UBS of a review of its domicile, a merger proposal involving a foreign bank, the transfer of group functions from Zurich to New York or London, and a decline in the number of banking employees beyond what digitalisation explains. Early warning signs are already present in the form of recurrent media reports of relocation plans, but they would become significant only if they were followed by decisions of the board of directors, applications to foreign supervisors or changes in the legal structure of the group.

Comparing the scenarios

Set side by side, the four scenarios show which elements of the Zurich financial centre are robust and which are exposed. Insurance and reinsurance appear strong in all four, because they rest on global diversification, on a supervisory regime recognised as equivalent by the European Union and on a cluster of expertise that has grown since the founding of Swiss Re in 1863. The domestic banking system, anchored by the Zürcher Kantonalbank and Raiffeisen, is equally robust, since its business depends on Swiss savers, homeowners and companies. Pension capital and the asset management built on it, the universities and the legal infrastructure also survive in every scenario, although their international reach varies.

The exposed elements are the global investment banking and capital markets functions, whose fate depends on UBS, and the cross-border wealth management business, whose fate depends on access to clients and on the confidence of foreign governments. Tokenised markets and crypto-assets and Digital Assets occupy an intermediate position. They can flourish in the European anchor scenario as part of a larger network and in the global niche scenario as a Swiss specialism, but they would remain marginal in the fortress and decline scenarios. The competitive landscape reinforces this reading. The Global Financial Centres Index of March 2026 placed New York, London, Hong Kong and Singapore at the top, with Dubai in seventh place, which shows how far the Asian and Gulf centres discussed in Chapter L.I have advanced.⁹

The scenarios differ above all in their consequences. None of them can be excluded in September 2026. The European anchor scenario corresponds most closely to the declared strategy of the Federal Council. The global niche scenario extends the experience of the financial centre since 2009. The fortress scenario reflects political currents that the votes of June and September 2026 have contained without removing them. The managed decline scenario is the one that the capital debate has made thinkable for the first time. A robust strategy for any actor in the Zurich financial centre is one that remains viable in all four worlds.

Notes

1. Swiss Parliament, news release of 11 June 2026 (cited above), noting that a final parliamentary decision could not be taken before 2027. ↩
2. State Secretariat for International Finance, Tätigkeitsbericht 2025 (cited above). ↩
3. Swiss Bankers Association, Stellungnahme: Stabilisierung und Weiterentwicklung der Beziehungen Schweiz–EU, 21 October 2025 (cited above). ↩
4. Loyens & Loeff, “New rules for Swiss banks serving EU customers under CRD VI” (cited above). ↩
5. State Secretariat for International Finance, Tätigkeitsbericht 2025 (cited above). ↩
6. finews.asia, “Global Wealth Report: Hong Kong Overtakes Switzerland” (cited above). ↩
7. UBS, statement of 23 September 2026 (cited above). ↩
8. Kanton Zürich, Amt für Wirtschaft, “Finanzdienstleistungen” (cited above). ↩
9. Z/Yen and China Development Institute, The Global Financial Centres Index 39, 26 March 2026, https://www.zyen.com/publications/public-reports/the-global-financial-centres-index-39/. ↩

For general information only. This article does not constitute legal or tax advice, does not replace advice on an individual case and creates no lawyer-client relationship. It reflects the legal position as of September 2025.