Discovery in April 1977 and the size of the losses

From recession to hidden insolvency

The turning point came with the oil crisis of 1973 and the recession that followed it in Italy. The Italian companies financed by Texon were small and medium-sized firms in sectors that depended on consumer demand, on tourism and on cheap energy. Many of them ran into losses, and some were unable to pay interest on their debts to Texon. The establishment could not call in loans to firms that had no money, and it could not sell participations in companies that nobody wanted to buy. The managers in Chiasso had two options: report the losses to Zurich or cover them. They chose to cover them. New fiduciary deposits paid the interest due on old ones, and fresh loans to the Italian companies kept them from bankruptcy. Swissinfo's retrospective of 2002 summarizes the outcome: the companies held within Texon accumulated considerable deficits, and by 1977 the managers could no longer cover the growing losses.¹

A system of this kind can continue only while new money flows in faster than losses accumulate. In 1976 and early 1977 that condition no longer held. The lira fell sharply in 1976, Italy tightened its currency controls and made the illegal export of capital a criminal offence, and the Italian economy remained weak. On 21 January 1976 the Italian government closed the foreign exchange market after spending 516 million dollars in the first twenty days of the month to support the lira, and in March it replaced the administrative sanctions for the illegal export of capital with fines and prison sentences. Texon's hidden losses grew while its access to fresh deposits shrank.²

The discovery

The discovery came from inside the Kreditanstalt. In March 1977 the mechanism of the Chiasso branch came to the knowledge of Robert Jeker of the Kreditanstalt, and only then, in the words of the company history summarized by Le Temps, was the general alarm raised.³ The bank confronted Kuhrmeier, who admitted the facts and resigned on 13 April 1977. On the following day, 14 April, the Kreditanstalt published a press release. The first public statement referred to a possible loss of CHF 250 million arising from unauthorized transactions at the Chiasso branch.⁴ Within days the figure had become implausible, and the press in Switzerland and Italy began to speak of billions.

On 24 April 1977, the Ticino authorities arrested Kuhrmeier and the two vice-directors. The charge was unfaithful management (amministrazione infedele), which the Swiss Criminal Code then punished in Article 159.⁵ The investigation was led by the public prosecutor of the Sottoceneri, Paolo Bernasconi, who would later become one of the best-known Swiss experts in economic criminal law and international mutual assistance.⁶ In Chiasso, according to a later account, residents watched the arrests of their bank's director as an event that would shake the whole Swiss banking sector.⁷

Date Event April 1961 Texon founded in Liechtenstein 1968–1969 Tax irregularity found; talk with Kuhrmeier January 1975 Kuhrmeier promoted senior director January 1976 UBS warns the Kreditanstalt March 1977 Robert Jeker uncovers the mechanism 13 April 1977 Kuhrmeier resigns 14 April 1977 Press release of the Kreditanstalt 24 April 1977 Arrest of Kuhrmeier and two colleagues 2 June 1977 Due diligence agreement concluded 22 June 1977 Debate in the National Council 1 July 1977 Agreement in force June–July 1979 Trial before the Court of Assizes 3 July 1979 Verdict

Notes

1. SWI swissinfo.ch, "La grande leçon du scandale Texon" (above): the oil crisis of 1973 and the following recession hit the operation; the companies held in Texon accumulated large deficits, and in 1977 the managers could no longer cover the losses; total commitments estimated at "more than 2 billion francs". ↩
2. "Chiuso il mercato dei cambi", l'Unità, 21 January 1976, 1, https://archivio.unita.news/assets/main/1976/01/21/page_001.pdf ("Il governo ha deliberato questa notte di chiudere il mercato dei cambi a partire da stamani 21 gennaio"; 516 million dollars spent in the first twenty days of January to support the lira); "La lira e le misure valutarie", l'Unità, 6 March 1976, 1, https://archivio.unita.news/assets/main/1976/03/06/page_001.pdf ("misure pecuniarie e detentive" against illegal exporters of capital, previously an "illecito amministrativo"). The reconstruction of Texon's liquidity position is the author's inference from these facts and from SWI swissinfo.ch (above). See also Chapter D.II. ↩
3. Le Temps, "Grandes affaires économiques suisses (26)" (above): Robert Jeker discovered the mechanism in March 1977; Kuhrmeier resigned on 13 April and the press release followed on 14 April 1977 ("Il faudra que Robert Jeker, en mars 1977, apprenne le mécanisme pour que l'alarme générale soit déclenchée"). ↩
4. Ente Ticinese per il Turismo, "Lo 'scandalo' di Chiasso" (above): "Nell'aprile del 1977 si apprende che il Credito Svizzero … ha subìto o avrebbe subìto una perdita di 250 milioni di franchi a causa di operazioni non autorizzate avvenute all'interno della filiale di Chiasso". ↩
5. Ente Ticinese per il Turismo, "Lo 'scandalo' di Chiasso" (above) (arrest on 24 April "con l'accusa di amministrazione infedele"). Today the offence is criminal mismanagement (ungetreue Geschäftsbesorgung) under Art. 158 SCC, https://www.droit-bilingue.ch/en-de/3/31/311.0-158-194.html. ↩
6. Ente Ticinese per il Turismo, "Lo 'scandalo' di Chiasso" (above), naming the public prosecutor Paolo Bernasconi. ↩
7. SWI swissinfo.ch, "La grande leçon du scandale Texon" (above). ↩

For general information only. This article does not constitute legal or tax advice, does not replace advice on an individual case and creates no lawyer-client relationship. It reflects the legal position as of October 2026.